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“Standardizing by running code”: The Signal protocol and de facto 
standardization in end-to-end encrypted messaging 
After Edward Snowden’s revelations, encryption of online communications at a 
large scale and in a usable manner has become a matter of public concern. The 
most advanced and popular among recently-developed encryption protocols is 
currently the Signal protocol. While the Signal protocol is widely adopted and 
considered as an improvement over previous ones, it remains officially 
unstandardized, even though there is an informal draft elaborated towards that 
goal. The analysis of how this protocol was introduced and swiftly adopted by 
various applications, and of subsequent transformations of the encrypted 
messaging ecosystem, sheds light on how a particular period in the history of 
secure messaging has been marked by a “de facto standardization”. What can we 
learn about existing modes of governance of encryption and the histories of 
traditional standardization bodies, when analyzing the approach of 
“standardization by running code” adopted by Signal? And finally, how does the 
Signal protocol challenge a “linear”, evolution-based vision of messaging 
history? Drawing from a three-year qualitative investigation of end-to-end 
encrypted messaging, from a perspective informed by science and technology 
studies (STS), we seek to unveil the ensemble of processes that make the Signal 
protocol a quasi-standard. 
Keywords: Encryption; secure messaging; standards; standardization; Signal; 
protocols 
 
Introduction  
 
As it can hardly be disputed anymore, Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations have 
been a landmark event in the development of the secure communication field. 
Encryption of communications at a large scale and in a usable manner became a matter 
of public concern, with a new cryptographic imaginary taking hold, one which sees 
encryption as a necessary precondition for the formation of networked publics (Myers 
West, 2018). Alongside the turning of encryption into a full-fledged political issue, the 
Snowden revelations catalyzed long-standing debates within the field of secure 
messaging protocols. The cryptography community (in particular, academic and free 
software collectives) renewed their efforts to create next-generation secure messaging 
protocols in order to overcome the limits of existing protocols, such as PGP (Pretty 
Good Privacy) and OTR (Off-the-Record Messaging). As next-generation encryption is 
shaping the ways in which we can securely communicate, exchange, store content on 
the Internet, it is important to unveil the recent and less-recent history of these protocols 
and their key applications, to understand how the opportunities and constraints they 
provide to Internet users came about, and how both developer communities and 
institutions are working towards making them available for the largest numbers. 
One of the leading motivations behind this effort consisted in facilitating key 
exchange and key verification processes1, previously identified as the main obstacles to 
mass adoption of encryption (Whitten & Tygar, 1999). The most advanced and popular 
of these next generation protocols is currently the Signal protocol (formerly called 
Axolotl2), firstly introduced by the messaging application Signal, and adopted or forked 
by other instant messaging applications, ranging from WhatsApp and Wire to Matrix 
and Conversations. While the Signal protocol is widely adopted and considered as an 
improvement over both OTR and PGP, it remains officially unstandardized, even 
 
1 In public key cryptography, key exchange is the method by which cryptographic keys are 
exchanged between two parties; key verification is any way that lets you match a key to a 
person, making sure that it is indeed that person who uses the key (see e.g. 
https://ssd.eff.org/en/glossary/key-verification) 
2 From the name of an aquatic salamander with great self-healing capabilities, as the protocol 
can “heal itself” by preventing, in some cases, an attacker from accessing encrypted 
communications even after a session key is compromised. 
though there is an informal draft elaborated towards that goal by the protocol’s creators, 
Trevor Perrin and Moxie Marlinspike. 
The analysis of how this protocol was introduced and swiftly adopted by several 
applications, and of the subsequent transformations of the encrypted messaging 
ecosystem, sheds light on how a particular period in the history of secure messaging has 
been marked by a “de facto standardization” revolving around Signal. As we will 
address in more detail later, we call “de facto standardization” the process through 
which a feature or a system that is successfully implemented in a variety of scenarios is 
identified as “something that works”, is iterated and redeployed by others beyond its 
original developers, and becomes a quasi-standard through practice and implementation, 
therefore, without undergoing any institutionalized standardization procedure. By 
analyzing how this process has happened in the case of Signal, we will address the 
following questions. What can we learn about existing modes of governance of 
encryption and the histories of traditional standardization bodies, when analyzing the 
approach of “standardization by running code” adopted by Signal? And finally, how 
does the Signal protocol challenge a “linear”, evolution-based vision of messaging 
history? 
We analyze the case of the Signal protocol as it unveils an alternative history of 
secure messaging, where protocols mutually influence and borrow from each other; we 
will see how they even try to revert to their predecessors3 and renew them in the light of 
new norms and requirements brought forward by Signal, such as forward secrecy4, 
 
3 See the “renewal” of OTR with OMEMO, and of OpenPGP with Autocrypt, described further 
in this paper. 
4 Forward/future secrecy is a feature ensuring that a user’s session keys will not be 
compromised even if the private key of the server is compromised, and, in particular, it is 
meant to protect past sessions against future compromises of secret keys or passwords. 
nowadays accepted as the necessary minimum. Drawing from a three-year ethnographic 
investigation of end-to-end encrypted messaging, from a perspective informed by 
science and technology studies (STS), we seek to unveil the ensemble of processes that 
make the Signal protocol a quasi-standard. In its conclusions, the paper seeks to 
comment on the governance implications of this quasi-standardization process, both for 
the history of end-to-end encrypted messaging field and for the future of the main 
existing Internet governance standardization bodies, such as the IETF. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we situate our work within the 
relevant literature, in particular the multi-disciplinary work on the making of standards, 
and Internet governance research, in particular its recent STS-informed strand. We then 
proceed to outline our methodology and data collection protocol before moving on to 
situating the development of Signal in its socio-political, technical and economic 
context. This is followed by two empirically-driven sections that describe what we call 
the “de facto standardization” dynamic around Signal, and the complex and closely 
intertwined relationship between the culture and ethos of developers, the possible 
licensing choices, and the elaboration of business models that unfolded in this case. 
Finally, we move from the recent history to the future of Signal by describing its 
“feedback loop” effect (how older protocols are being refurbished due to its most recent 
developments) and offer some conclusions and directions for future research. 
 
Looking at history of encryption through the STS lenses of standardization 
and Internet governance 
 
 
 
This paper seeks to contribute primarily to two fields of analysis in science and 
technology studies that heavily interact with work done in other disciplines, including 
Internet history, economics and political sciences to name but three. The first one has a 
long-standing tradition in STS: the study of standards and their making -- how technical 
objects and protocols become the norm in their respective domains and sectors of 
activity, either by official, institutionalized means or treading less linear paths, or a mix 
of both. The second field has only recently begun to be connected to STS, but is 
otherwise a widely studied research field for scholars in a large number of disciplines: it 
is the study of Internet governance. By looking at the dynamics of “informal 
standardization” of encryption and understanding it, from an STS perspective, as part of 
Internet governance, we seek to shed light on those aspects of encryption today that 
have to do with its adoption by the general public, keener attention to usability, and 
design as a social and political choice.  
As the field of modern encryption protocols is rapidly evolving (as Signal lead 
developer Moxie Marlinspike summarizes in a landmark blogpost, “the ecosystem is 
moving”; Marlinspike, 2016), we acknowledge that some of the empirical elements 
obtained through interviews with key actors of this field have already in a way become 
history, as some of the controversies faced by Signal have been resolved since then, and 
the messenger, as well as the protocol, have been transformed. However, as the authors 
continue to be engaged in the field of secure messaging (in particular, one of them is a 
usability researcher for a messaging application), they are constantly exposed to 
critiques and debates over Signal’s design and governance choices. We have tried to 
reflect some of these debates in this paper. In this way, conducting an embedded, real-
time research and writing an STS-informed history of encryption protocols also allows 
us to understand the evolution of the debate about key obstacles to mass adoption of 
encryption, as well as adversarial capacities and subsequent risks shared by (potential) 
users.  
 
The making of standards as a making of (Internet) history 
 
Standardization processes have been a long-standing concern of science and 
technology studies (STS). As noted by Lawrence Busch, there is an “intimate 
connection between standards and power”, a power that “lies in their very subtlety” 
(Busch, 2011). Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star had long since noted that 
standards play an important role in the making of public policy and, more broadly, of 
social order: “standards […], however imbricated in our lives, are ordinarily invisible 
[…yet w]ho makes them, and who may change them? When and why do they become 
visible? How do they spread?” (Bowker and Star, 1999). A number of case study 
analyses of competing standards in information technology have contributed to shed 
light on these processes, including the birth of the QWERTY keyboard (David, 1985) 
and the VHS vs. Betamax controversy (Besen & Farrell, 1994). 
Technical standards, according to STS approaches, are implemented at once in 
physical forms, in social and economic interaction, and in their intended or inferred use. 
Several standards are developed (and recognized as such) intentionally, and result from 
a regulatory action or voluntary adoption. Standards endowed with formality are 
developed in dedicated organisations, such as the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) or, for the Web, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and 
take the form of documents that describe objects, their properties and the efforts to 
which they can be subjected without breaking or being compromised. One of these 
formats is the IETF’s Request for Comments, or RfC, whose very evolutions over time 
contribute to make visible the transformations of the IETF, its organizational forms and 
practices (see Braman, 2016). Internet governance literature in the political science and 
legal traditions has extensively examined “formal” standard development processes, 
addressing the particular mix of private regulation and governmental/intergovernmental 
intervention that characterizes most of them (see e.g. Weiser, 2001; Bygrave and Bing, 
2009). 
The meaning and pervasiveness of these standards in our everyday life often 
escapes our understanding as “common” users (Star, 2009), in a myriad of different 
situations. Given the attention that STS approaches give to the invisible and discrete 
processes that make a technical object what it is, it is not surprising that the making of 
standards -- the processes of standardisation themselves -- have been investigated by 
STS scholars in a variety of domains related to science and technology. The publication 
of a standard is only the beginning -- and indeed, as our case study for this paper will 
show, sometimes it is not even necessary; the adoption of something close to a 
‘standard’ may occur de facto or accidentally, with seemingly minor decisions and 
actions becoming crucial for the development of a field in a particular direction. 
In some instances, what determines the adoption of an object, process or 
protocol as a standard is its ability to circulate and get recognized: factors such as 
popular demand, perceived quality, and the credibility of its developers become crucial 
for a success. As Mendel (2006) points out, a number of dynamics support this 
circulation, from discussion forums to industry publications, as well as normative 
obligations to follow best practices: by not observing the standard, companies risk being 
locked out of their own sector (Murphy and Yates, 2009, 71). The stabilization of a 
standard -- usually seen as its widespread acceptance and its embeddedness in 
interactions -- has been variably identified by scholars as path dependency (Arthur, 
1989), irreversibility (Callon, 1991) and trajectory (Bowker and Star, 1999), but such 
analyses point to one main result: successful standards, however they come about, are 
often difficult to modify or replace. One clear example of this, when it comes to the 
Internet, is the Internet protocol for identification and location of computers on the 
Internet, IPv4. For computers today, the adherence to the protocol is somewhat of a 
“self-regulation for its own good”; IPv4 is intrinsic to all operating systems for them to 
be functional. However, as Laura DeNardis (2009) has finely analysed, IPv4 is unable 
to face the steady rise in the global demand for connectivity; nonetheless, the transition 
to its successor IPv6, providing a virtually unlimited number of addresses, has proven 
complicated, is implemented only gradually, and is still ongoing.  
Thus, the spread of standards through social, technical and institutional media 
can be understood as a complex and multifaceted process; mechanisms of 
standardization are economic, social and technical -- with different degrees of 
intentionality -- alongside the “official” institutional practices of certification and 
harmonization (Loconto and Busch, 2010).   
 
STS approaches to Internet governance: a focus on “mundane practices” 
 
A number of authors, some of whom with STS sensibilities but overall coming 
from a broader disciplinary spectrum, have examined in recent years how the concept 
and the practice of Internet governance may be reconsidered in light of an increasing 
number of informal uses, practices, norms that affect the distribution and the exercise of 
power on the Internet. While Michel van Eeten and Milton Mueller argue that the 
definition of governance should include “environments with low formalization, 
heterogeneous organizational forms, large number of actors and massively distributed 
authority and decision-making power” (van Eeten & Mueller, 2013), Sandra Braman 
suggests that the definition of governance may go as far as including “decision making 
with constitutive (structural) effect whether it takes place within the public or private 
sectors, and formally or informally” (Braman, 2009). Governance, according to 
Hofmann et al. (2016) may even be just a “side effect of actions with non-governance-
related aims”.  
Addressing the macro questions of politics and power related to IG requires 
unpacking the micro practices of governance as mechanisms of distributed, semi-formal 
or reflexive coordination, private ordering, and use of Internet resources (Epstein, 
Katzenbach and Musiani, 2016). Seemingly stable arrangements of IG heavily rely, for 
their functioning and their very existence, on a number of mundane activities and 
practices of internet design, regulation, and use, making Internet governance an 
“accomplishment embedded in everyday interaction” (West & Zimmerman, 1987, p. 
125). 
The STS-driven sensibility for social order as continuous and contested 
processes translates into a growing attention to the mundane practices of all those 
involved in providing and maintaining, hacking, developing and testing, and even using 
the Internet (Musiani, 2015), thus expanding the notion of governance in IG. These 
diverse practices are elements constitutive to articulating and challenging established, 
emerging or contested norms – the “doing” of IG. As such, at an analytical level, 
borrowing from the rich STS tradition of studying the scientific enterprise (e.g. Latour 
& Woolgar, 1986), this ensemble of invisible work and mundane practices is not treated 
as markedly separate from the designated IG institutions. Thus, IG as a continuously 
emerging and dissolving order, in this view, is – rephrasing John Law (1992, p. 382) – 
an effect generated by heterogeneous means. We will see how this focus on mundane 
practices is useful to unveil the informal dimensions of governance in processes such as 
de facto standardization, licensing, etc. The attention to those mundane practices helps 
tracing the development of encryption protocols as intertwining “micro histories”, 
where crucial decisions often happen during offline, off-the-record gatherings, or on 
small-scale mailing lists. 
 
Methodology and data collection 
 
Data was collected within the frame of the H2020 CAPS research project 
NEXTLEAP (2016-2018). After completing a survey of 30 cases of encrypted 
messaging applications and a history of encryption protocols (Ermoshina, Musiani & 
Halpin, 2016), we have proceeded to select a few applications that could be studied in 
more detail and in a qualitative fashion, with a case-study methodology including in-
depth interviews and both online and live ethnography. Signal has been selected as one 
of these cases, due to its central role in the encrypted messaging ecosystem in terms of 
number of users, media attention, available documentation on protocol development. 
Thus, our approach can be described as a multi-sited ethnography, inasmuch as we have 
undertook research in, and between, several online and offline locations as part of our 
study, and we have also explicitly conceived a protocol/system (Signal) as “part of a 
larger context that exceeds the boundaries of the field site” (Muir, 2011; see also a 
reflection on the method by first proponent George Marcus, pointing out that multi-sited 
ethnography has been “most creative, critical, and interesting where it has been 
involved with the [STS] study of distributed knowledge systems”, Marcus, 2012). 
STS methods allow to analyze the interfaces of messaging apps as “meeting 
points” between the intentional goals of developers and the needs of users (Oudshoorn 
& Pinch, 2005). STS aim at providing a fieldwork-driven sense-making of emerging 
systems and communities of practice, doing ‘analytical thick descriptions’ (for a recent 
treatment of the concept see Ponterotto, 2006) of events, artifacts, organizations – in 
particular, moments of crises, debates, controversies – to try and understand the life of a 
technical artifact, from its creation to its appropriation and reconfigurations by users, to 
its becoming a subject of public debate, of governance, of lobbying. The primary 
methodology to achieve this goal is to observe, for relatively prolonged periods of time, 
specific case-study groups or communities, conducting on the side in-depth interviews 
with their members and reading appropriate documentation such as release notes or 
accounts of working sessions.  
Just as we seek to have a nuanced understanding of developers’ motivations and 
the representations they have of users and their needs, in the tradition of “user studies” 
developed within STS, we understand users not as a homogeneous and passive group, 
but as active contributors participating in innovation and co-shaping technologies, 
which is possible in software development via routes such as bug reporting, pull 
requests on code, mailing list comments, and in person contact of users with developers. 
Interview subjects that were developers were mostly selected due to pre-existing 
personal relationships with the cryptographic research community of *** research team 
members. We also reached out to some developers via the GitLab and GitHub pages of 
the projects without personal connections (e.g. Ricochet, Conversations). In contrast, 
user studies were done with individuals that were selected more by chance via their 
attendance at training events in their local environments (both high-risk, in the case of 
Ukraine and Russia, and low-risk in the case of France, Germany, Austria and the 
United Kingdom) or conferences in pre-selected venues that were determined to be 
likely to attract high-risk users that lived in areas that, due to the level of repression, 
made it difficult if not impossible to interview them in their native environment, or 
would make it such that they could not speak openly there due to repression. This was 
the case for users from Egypt, Turkey, Kenya, Iran, where the interviews took place in 
March 2017 at the Internet Freedom Festival and at RightsCon. All interviews were 
made between Fall 2016 and Spring 2017, for a total of 52 interviews. This article 
draws in particular from six of those, conducted with developers of Signal-based apps. 
Moreover, as the authors continue to be engaged within the field of cryptographic tools 
and protocols, they have been exposed to many ongoing debates in the community 
around Signal protocol and its implications for the field of encryption in secure 
messaging. This embedded research helps us put current and further developments of 
Signal protocol in a larger perspective. 
 
The Signal protocol and “mass encryption”: the historical turn of a field in 
the making 
 
The field of end-to-end encrypted, secure messaging is a very diverse and 
complex one, both for technical reasons and socio-political and economic factors. This 
section of our article situates the birth and development of the Signal protocol in this 
context, addressing the changes brought about in the secure messaging field by the 
Snowden revelations, and examining the mostly pre-Snowden, recent-history debates 
that have taken place around Signal’s predecessors OTR and PGP. We show how Signal 
seems to have drawn its success from a mix of continuity with previous protocols and 
ability to disrupt and innovate their well-known flaws; we also choose to “take the 
actors seriously” as they talk about Signal protocol as a new “norm”, a reference for 
their own protocols and applications. 
Pre-existing the Snowden revelations, but strongly reconfigured by them, secure 
messaging is a lively and constantly-evolving ecosystem of projects. Developers seek, 
in particular, to apply the technique of end-to-end encryption to messaging systems: 
among the most widely known tools pertaining to this category are Signal, Telegram5 
and WhatsApp, each with different motivations and solutions for implementing 
encryption6. 
A recent systematization of knowledge paper on secure messaging argues that 
the field suffered from the “lack of a clear winner in the race for widespread 
deployment and the persistence of many lingering unsolved research problems”, as well 
as discrepancies between “grandiose claims” and actual provided security (Unger et al., 
2015). Part of the reason of the field’s diversity and complexity is the relatively short 
life span of several projects, for a number of reasons including technical and academic 
experimentation that did not deliver as hoped or expected, the failure to develop an 
economic model, internal governance, and the inability to rally a critical mass of users 
around the app, often due to a lack of ease-of-use. The target audience of the 
applications, especially those born post-Snowden, is far from being limited to tech-
savvy and activist groups; several projects are aimed at widespread use. A majority of 
members of the technical crypto community consider user-friendliness and usability as 
the main issue that stands between the wish of large-scale adoption and its realization in 
practice. Encryption software is often understood as an instrument in broader struggles 
to define the meaning of Internet freedoms (Hellegren, 2017); end-to-end encrypted 
messaging tools are the subject of a two-faced discourse, on empowerment and 
protection of fundamental civil liberties on one hand, and allegations of links to 
terrorism on the other, the latter being fueled by previous narratives about decentralized 
 
5 Interestingly, Telegram does not actually offer end-to-end encryption by default, but is 
nonetheless widely considered as part of the secure messaging market. 
6 Elements in the following two paragraphs have previously been discussed in more detail in 
(Musiani & Ermoshina, 2017). 
technologies and peer-to-peer as technologies favoring both empowerment and illegal 
practices (Musiani, 2013). These issues are taking place in the broader context of 
discussions about governance by infrastructure and civil liberties (Musiani et al., 2016). 
Indeed, after the Snowden revelations, several companies, in particular those 
based in the United States, have implemented a number of cryptography-based 
organizational and technical responses aimed at restoring user trust in their cloud-based 
services. This dynamic has been identified as a “cryptographic turn” opening up new 
issues and questions from both legal and political standpoints (Rubinstein & Van 
Hoboken, 2014) and is considered a new phase of the 1990s “Crypto Wars” (Froomkin 
& McLaughlin, 2016), where cryptographic features of various types of protocols 
behave as micro-instruments of governance. They determine, at a technical level, the 
limits and possibilities of collaboration with governmental and private actors. For 
example, server-side encryption does not offer the same conditions as end-to-end 
encryption7 in case that a “forced decryption” is required by law enforcement 
procedures. Cryptographic properties such as forward secrecy or non-repudiation, as 
well as key management8, technically define terms and conditions of possible 
interactions and data exchange with third-party actors, would it be private or public 
sector. 
 
7 Server-side encryption means that data is encrypted on the server (of the company providing 
the messaging services). End-to-end encryption posits that only the communicating parties 
can read the message, which is encrypted in transit and on users’ terminals.  
8 For the definitions of forward secrecy, see above. Key management includes all operations 
related to the management of cryptographic keys in an encrypted system, including their 
generation, exchange, storage, use, destruction and replacement. Non-repudiation is the 
assurance that someone cannot deny the validity of a particular operation; in cryptography, 
the concept refers to a service that is able to provide proof of the origin of data as well as 
their integrity. 
In this context, many actors in the field share a tacit agreement that the Signal 
protocol’s Double Ratchet9 is currently the leading protocol for instant messaging. In 
order to better understand how the Signal protocol interacts with previous and further 
developments of encryption protocols, one should look at the historical debates around 
two major protocols, that have been somehow dominating the ecosystem for many years 
before Snowden: OTR (Off-the-Record, used to encrypt instant messages sent over 
XMPP) and PGP (Pretty Good Privacy, used to encrypt emails). 
The main problems of PGP discussed in the cryptographic community, and 
shared by advanced users, could be resumed to two main aspects: complex key 
management and lack of repudiation and forward secrecy. The crisis of “public key 
infrastructures”10 and of the very concept of cryptographic keys and signatures was also 
highlighted by digital security trainer communities and international NGOs promoting 
privacy-enhancing technologies, such as Tactical Tech and the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (Musiani & Ermoshina, 2017). While still offering one of the most 
cryptographically robust solutions, PGP clearly faces usability challenges.  
The OTR protocol started as a research project at UC Berkeley in 2002, and was 
first released in 2004. OTR developer Ian Goldberg described himself, in our interview 
with him, as a very early PGP user and mostly an “email person”; it was his student, 
 
9 The Double Ratchet algorithm is a key management algorithm developed by the creators of 
Signal, Trevor Perrin and Moxie Marlinspike, in 2013, which manages the ongoing 
renewal and maintenance of short-lived session keys after a first key exchange. It is a 
“double” ratchet because it combines a cryptographic component with a key derivation 
function. 
10 Public-key (or asymmetric) cryptography is a cryptographic system that uses pairs of 
keys: public keys which may be disseminated widely, and private keys known only to the 
owner. PKI is the set of roles, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, 
distribute, use, public-key cryptography. 
Nikita Borisov, who drew Goldberg’s attention to the growing field of social 
networking and instant messaging, thus identifying a new security gap to be filled. Ian’s 
description of the mission behind OTR relates this protocol to preexisting technologies, 
as a way to respond to challenges that were not properly addressed by PGP: 
“your choices at that time were either completely unprotected communication 
neither encrypted nor authenticated, or PGP in which case it’s confidential and 
authenticated unless your key leaks in which it’s not confidential and the 
authentication with digital signatures leads to non-repudiation” [Interview with Ian 
Goldberg, May 2018] 
While OTR’s solution to use per-conversation keys offered good repudiation 
and forward secrecy, it did not permit group chat encryption, as, in Goldberg’s words, 
“that was how instant communication worked back then: you had to be online at the 
same time”: OTR’s design was inspired by Aim and other existing tools, that required 
synchrony. Moreover, while popular in high-risk activist communities, OTR-based 
applications (such as Jabber) were widely criticized for the lack of multi-device support 
and other usability problems. 
These shared concerns were addressed by the Signal protocol, according to 
Goldberg: “Text Secure, and later Signal, basically took OTR protocol and added basic 
features to it to make it work in an asynchronous setting”. Using per-conversation key 
material in a similar manner to OTR, it did not force complex key management on the 
users. It maintained properties of repudiation and forward secrecy by virtue of the 
Axolotl Diffie-Hellman key ratchet11, but added “future secrecy” so that messages could 
not be read at any point in the future in the case of a key material compromise (Cohn-
Gordon et al., 2016; see also note 4). It solved the asynchronous messaging problem by 
 
11 https://github.com/trevp/double_ratchet/wiki; https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dhratchet/wiki  
virtue of allowing longer-term pre-keys managed by the Signal server, and offered 
group messaging implemented as point-to-point messaging.  
As the Signal protocol initiated a dialogue with the previous crypto protocol 
“tradition” (mainly by addressing the aforementioned limits of OTR and PGP), it 
quickly attracted the attention of the academic cryptographic community, and only 
minor flaws were found (Frosch et al., 2016). Although alternative approaches were 
developed and widely deployed, like MTProto by Telegram, these protocols developed 
their own cryptographic primitives and so received less attention from the academic 
community, although a number of bugs and usability problems were revealed (Jakobsen 
and Orlandi, 2016; Abu-Salma, 2017). Interestingly, while Signal has deeply influenced 
the crypto protocol field, it did not depart from previous efforts, but drew from their 
well-known flaws: it is this continuity that can partly account for the interest of crypto 
experts. 
With minor variants implemented in the vastly popular WhatsApp messenger, 
the core Signal Protocol seems well on its way to clearly replace the use of 
XMPP+OTR and even a competitive, if somewhat “boutique”, feature for mainstream 
messaging services (as shown by the adoption of the Signal protocol as an option by 
both Google Allo and Facebook Messenger). Encrypted messaging applications like 
WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal are now the default application of this kind for users 
that consider themselves to be high-risk. Usability studies have shown that although 
Signal (similar to OTR) is easy to set up and use, even highly-skilled users fail to use 
verification correctly. Currently, Signal is centralized, as a single server mediates the 
setup of the protocol in most widespread deployments (WhatsApp, Google Allo, 
Facebook Messenger, Wire)12. 
Open-source alternatives that claim to use the Signal protocol or its forks13 exist, 
such as the centralized application Wire that uses a fork of Axolotl protocol called 
Proteus. Parts of the Signal protocol were copied by a draft XMPP Foundation standard 
called OMEMO, for use by applications such as Conversations and ChatSecure, which 
led to usage of Signal’s double ratchet in federated projects. Another decentralized 
project called Matrix has reused parts of the Signal protocol to integrate them into their 
own cryptographic library called Olm14. While Signal appears to be widely adopted and 
considered an improvement over both OTR and PGP, the core Signal protocol remains 
officially unstandardized, even though the protocol’s creators Trevor Perrin and Moxie 
Marlinspike have produced an informal draft after considerable “community pressure” 
[as Matrix.org lead developer Matthew Hodgson puts it]. 
 
A “quasi-standardization” process 
 
As we have seen earlier on in the literature review discussion, standardization 
can happen in ways and arenas other than formal working groups and bodies through 
codified procedures. This section delves into the ways in which the process which we 
 
12 It is interesting to note that, although we will not focus on it in this particular paper, 
centralization per se has become another controversy, promoted by Moxie as a better 
governance option for secure messaging apps, compared to decentralized architectures 
considered as less stable. 
13 Forking a piece of software during its development process means that developers take a copy 
of its source code and start independent development on it, creating a separate piece of 
software. An act of forking is generally not merely a technical issue, but involves a 
(governance/organizational) change, possibly conflictual, in the developer community. 
14 https://matrix.org/git/olm/about/  
have called ‘de facto standardization’ (or quasi-standardization, or standardization ‘by 
running code’), happens in the Signal case. We see how this dynamic is boosted by a 
number of factors, which include a relative mistrust in standardizing bodies (not 
necessarily in their trustworthiness, but in their suitability to produce results adapted to 
the encrypted messaging case), a perceived need for “best practices” from which 
standardization would follow, and the necessity to build a ground for common 
knowledge before attempting to “box” it. 
While most users we have interviewed, including high-risk users, do not appear 
to have standardization as an explicit priority, developers care deeply about standards as 
“something they would eventually be working on”, namely for increasing the ‘dialogue’ 
between applications and reduce the silo effect: 
In the long term I am not opposed to the idea of standardizing, it’s great to have a 
reference for interoperability. [Michael Rogers, Briar lead developer] 
 
Standardization serves as a reference and thus as an important communication or 
mediation instrument, that helps the security community understand each other and 
build a ground for common knowledge (such as cryptographic libraries), and also 
guarantees a smoother development of new applications on top of standardized 
protocols. The approach to standardization as a tool for cooperation is, for instance, 
largely promoted by the decentralized secure messaging application Delta.Chat, which 
reuses a set of open standards (namely, PGP and SMTP/IMAP) and advertises the usage 
of standards as a proof of transparency, interoperability and openness, while criticizing 
Signal approach for its “silo effect”15 and “control” over users. 
 
15 One of the Delta Chat’s core developers, Holger Krekel, uses the term “messaging silos” 
to describe the effect of non-interoperability of the new secure messaging applications that 
Yet a widespread discontent with existing standards bodies is expressed by 
developers, for several reasons. Developers underline recent transformations of these 
organizations, referring to a previous ‘golden age’ of standardizing bodies, when their 
mode of existence was closer to that of FOSS communities. Our respondents note the 
growing importance of private actors as stakeholders within standardizing bodies.  
“My impression of the IETF is that it’s not the same beast it was in the early days. 
There was a time when it was a group of enthusiastic people who would come to 
the IETF with an idea that was sort of halfway finished and they’d say look I 
wanna let everybody know about this, let’s knock it into shape and we’ll all build 
on it. I think it’s become a much slower moving and more adversarial environment. 
This area of technologies has attracted more money and more corporate 
participation and therefore, conflicts of interest”. [Michael Rogers, Briar lead 
developer] 
This institutionalization of standardizing bodies and their progressive removal 
from coding communities creates an environment that is less suitable for experiments 
and unfinished projects:    
“I think that [an automated, periodical clearing out of message history] is 
something that we will implement, it just probably will not be standardized because 
the XMPP community is very conservative. I don’t think… they don’t fully get it. 
It’s something that users want… so why?... I don’t know. They end up in that old 
school stuff”. [Chris Ballinger, ChatSecure developer] 
As Callon (1986) would put it, standardization implies the “translation” of a 
protocol as a sociotechnical experiment into a pre-standard, able to “enroll” and 
convince various agents within evaluation bodies. Standardization involves collective 
work that opens up the core-set of protocol authors to include external experts from 
 
build their own protocols instead of reusing existing standards that could, according to 
him, foster interoperability and give users “more freedom”. 
standardizing organizations, some of them being far from users’ experiences and needs, 
and from the “real” economy of the encrypted messaging field -- a process that is hardly 
appealing to some developers as it is seen as time-consuming in early stages of project 
development:  
“I wouldn’t really think about submitting something to the IETF on early stage 
these days because I think that would probably involve a lot of work to convince 
other people to allow it to become a standard… and obviously everybody would 
have their own thoughts of how better to work.” [Michael Rogers, Briar lead 
developer] 
Instead, most developers share the philosophy that they would build the 
application first, and then focus on standardization and decentralization via the use of 
open standards:    
I used to work with W3C a long time ago and I am very aware of how they work 
and that they may have some limitations. We want to get Matrix as mature enough 
and solid and stable enough, then we can pass it over to a proper governance 
organization but right now it’s still evolving very rapidly. [Matthew Hodgson, 
Matrix.org lead developer]  
In the case of secure messaging, it is still felt that more development is needed 
on the code, and standardization would only slow down existing development efforts. 
Indeed, a new way of ‘quasi-standardization’ or ‘standardization by running 
code’ is being practiced in the field of end-to-end encrypted messaging applications, 
around the Signal protocol. In this process, a quasi-standard is defined as “something 
that works” and that’s been iterated and redeployed by others. In this sense, all of the 
various Signal protocol deployments (e.g. Wire, WhatsApp and OMEMO-based apps 
such as Conversations and ChatSecure) work as crash-tests for the protocol, where the 
protocol gets forged by usage. As Michael Rogers explains it, Signal’s approach 
consists in first developing the protocol until the stage of “something that works” is 
reached. Only then comes the phase of documentation, in case there is a demand for 
interoperability or reimplementation from the developer community. Standardization, if 
it arrives, happens at a much later stage. 
The Signal protocol, characterized by the double Diffie-Hellman ratchet, is now 
considered the best practice in the field and becomes a trend-setter for other projects in 
terms of privacy and security features (e.g. forward secrecy and future secrecy for 
example). Developers, even those working in federated (e.g. Conversations) or peer-to-
peer (e.g. Briar) projects, see the Signal solution as one of the best designs available, 
even if it is not fully standardized.  
 
Forking the Signal protocol: Licensing problems and non-standardization as 
a business-model 
 
The history of the Signal protocol interestingly illustrates how, in the field of 
secure messaging (as it is, of course, the case in other areas of software development) 
there is a complex and closely intertwined relationship between the culture and ethos of 
developers, the possible licensing choices, and the elaboration of business models. This 
section addresses how this nexus of issues has unfolded around Signal. In particular, it 
shows how some forks of the Signal protocol, such as Wire, have travelled a bumpy 
road towards re-implementation of the protocol, primarily due to Signal’s intentional 
non-release of complete specifications as part of its business model, and to a 
controversy around licensing. Indeed, the reason why standards are different than 
‘mere’ code is that they describe the specifications for code, and this code may then be 
independently implemented in conformance to the specification with varying licensing 
options, ranging from open source to proprietary options. Thus, licenses are relevant to 
business development in relation to protocols, and the choice not to release full 
specifications shapes the field at various levels, including the politics of open/closed 
source and the structuring of the crypto community. 
The field of instant messaging applications has been deeply transformed with a 
number of implementations of the Signal protocol, but also because of the growing 
popularity of other secure messaging tools, such as Telegram, Threema or Wickr that 
use their own protocols. The turn to encryption has modified the market and brought 
considerable changes on the level of governance, engaging important private sector 
players in the game:     
What is happening last two years [2014-2016] is fantastic, with a number of 
messengers popping up and also greater publicity around Axolotl or Signal… 
Snowden also talking about it... So this is something that is really good for the 
industry. And we’ve seen it’s triggered even the big ones who started using 
encryption [Alan Duric, CTO of Wire]  
One of the most well-known and popular forks of the Signal protocol is called 
Proteus and is used by the chat application Wire. Wire was launched by ex-Skype 
developers, with a desire, according to its CTO, to respond to “one of the biggest gaps 
that was missing on the market, related to privacy and security”. Wire’s primary 
targeted user group is identified as “privacy-aware consumers”. 
As Wire is not aimed at activists or at a tech-savvy audience, but at the average 
user, one of their main concerns was to build a usable interface and integrate new 
features that would distinguish them from other end-to-end encrypted messengers. 
Thus, Wire supports drawings, GIF exchange, large end-to-end encrypted group chats, 
multiple-participant group video calls, disappearing timed messages, file transfer. A 
number of our interviewees have underlined the aesthetic aspect of Wire’s UI as an 
advantage, favoring Wire’s widespread adoption as opposed to Signal. Another of 
Wire’s selling arguments is the voice calls quality and encryption, as it offers end-to-
end encrypted voice calls using a specific protocol based on constant bit rate 
encoding16.  
The underlying Wire encryption protocol, called Proteus, is a fork of Axolotl 
with “pieces that were needed to have support for the multiple devices as a standalone”, 
in the words of Alan Duric. However, difficulties and tensions have been observed 
around Wire’s attempts to reimplement the Signal protocol. Some of these difficulties 
are due to the lack of specifications (documentation)17:         
The problem there was with Axolotl, if you wanted to build it completely from the 
specification, there was, I would even say on purpose, not enough available 
documentation. […] I was very naive and went to Moxie last year in June and 
asked him to review our implementation and we would pay him a very good 
money for that. Instead he said you can pay 1,5 million, and I will keep your 
binaries and will help you to get going the implementation. And then I was like… 
yeah, exactly…  What happened afterwards – he said he would sue us and started 
threatening about it. And you know that’s a threat, and our legal guys said that’s a 
threat and it needs to be legally handled. So we sued him for a threat. And then it 
was just settled. He dropped his charges, we dropped our charges and we are using 
Axolotl the way we do and how we would like. [Alan Duric, Wire] 
Therefore, the lack of specification somehow becomes a business model and 
obliges developers to re-code the protocol from scratch sometimes using other 
programming languages. However, since then, Signal has published a draft specification 
for its encryption protocol18. As our respondents explain, this would likely not have 
happened without the pressure from other developer communities. Indeed, the 
 
16 https://medium.com/@wireapp/a-major-upgrade-to-calling-9ac8780741a1  
17 This independent audit of OMEMO protocol includes a dedicated part on Signal protocol and refers to 
lack of documentation:  https://conversations.im/omemo/audit.pdf  
18 https://whispersystems.org/docs/specifications/xeddsa/ 
Matrix.org team, as well as other developers, reached out to Signal with demands to 
provide better documentation: 
OWS [Open Whisper Systems, the company managing Signal] did not prioritize 
standardizing [the protocol] both because it gave them flexibility to change it as 
well as allow it to be more valuable to them as intellectual property. However, they 
have just finished standardizing a lot of it, […] and I think to some extent that was 
because of the pressure coming from community like us [Matthew Matrix.org lead 
developer] 
Thus, standardization is understood at the same time as an “obstacle” (as it 
reduces the ability to quickly modify the protocol if needed), and as an enabler, that 
creates possibilities for interoperability and the evolution of the whole field of secure 
messaging, as it fosters development of new tools and improvement of protocols. 
One of ChatSecure’s developers explains this conflict as a consequence of a 
specific licensing politics, that lead to tampering and modifications in the legal terms 
and agreements between the Signal team and other implementers:  
“Signal protocol is open source under the GPL, that means you can’t integrate it 
into a commercial product; that’s why OWS were getting large licensing 
agreements from Facebook and Google and WhatsApp to integrate without 
opening up all of their source code. Part of that they were incompatibilities with 
GPL and AppStore specifically. So we needed to get some of the legal language 
exempted [...] Moxie [Signal lead developer] needs to protect his revenue. Part of 
his arguments with Wire was that they [Signal] hadn’t documented Signal protocol, 
so there was no open specification, so if you wanted to write a compatible 
reimplementation, you would have to read the source code which would create a 
derivative work, which would not allow you to use it commercially because he 
would argue he still has copyright of the majority of the work”. [Chris Ballinger, 
ChatSecure developer]  
The Signal developers are concerned about the technical competence of having 
third-party developers standardize or deploy forks of their protocol; one of them 
remarks that “Moxie is a very good coder and his standards are very high”, although it 
is likely that for Signal’s main developer, avoiding the forking of the system in ways 
that could make it less secure is about more than high standards, but also about 
maintaining the integrity of the system in accomplishing what it is meant to do. Indeed, 
the Signal team is also concerned about the possibility of not being able to update the 
protocol rapidly enough in response to research and bugs. This makes it possible to use 
the non-standardization of the protocol as part of Signal’s business model, where the 
expertise and specification necessary for a proper deployment of the protocol can be 
offered by the Signal team as a service: 
“You can say OK we will license this technology which is not something I am 
interested in because I would like it to remain free software. But you can also say 
‘we are the people who understand this technology, it makes sense to hire us if you 
want to deploy it.’ If people build systems on top of it, then they pay somebody to 
contribute changes down into that codebase” [Michael Rogers, Briar lead 
developer] 
As we have seen from our user survey and observation of security trainings, 
open-source and licensing choices are less covered in high-risk trainings, as high-risk 
users do not always associate open-source with security. Open-source is often perceived 
as a less important criteria in the context of an immediate physical threat, as when a 
proprietary but “efficient” and “easy to explain” solution exists, trainers will give 
priority to it. The primary task in high-risk contexts with low-knowledge users is to help 
them quickly abandon unencrypted tools as well as tools that collaborate with their 
adversaries. However, users do care about sources of funding and business models of 
end-to-end encrypted messaging applications. It was and is the case for Signal, as well; 
in particular, questions about business models were very frequent on different chats on 
cybersecurity that we have been observing since September 2016. Users ask for 
transparency of funding but at the same time show a certain scepticism regarding 
crowdfunding models (donations) that seem not sustainable enough for an application to 
be properly maintained.  
Recent critiques addressed to Signal concern their dependency on US 
government funding:  
Signal was created by the same spooky regime change outfits that fund the Tor 
Project. The money primarily comes through the federal government’s premier 
Internet Freedom venture capital outfit: Open Technology Fund, which works 
closely with the State Department’s regime change arm and is funded through 
several layers of Cold War CIA cutouts — including Radio Free Asia and the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors.19 
Telegram creator Pavel Durov’s critique of Signal goes in the same direction, 
noticing that no US-government funded application could be trusted. 
To summarize, the development and deployment of the Signal protocol show for 
encrypted messaging – as the history of software development has revealed for other 
subfields – how licensing choices, business models and politics of open/closed source 
are complex socio-technical processes, embedded in both community-related 
interactions, economic context and legal arrangements.  
 
A feedback loop: futures of crypto protocols after Signal 
 
The Signal protocol has deeply influenced the crypto protocol field by 
introducing a combination of properties, such as forward and future secrecy and non-
repudiation, combined with a modern interface, that have become a new minimum 
 
19 https://surveillancevalley.com/blog/government-backed-privacy-tools-are-not-going-to-protect-us-
from-president-trump  
required for a secure messaging application, without being an actual, formal standard. 
As the inventor of the OMEMO protocol mentions, “If you are designing a new 
protocol for end-to-end encryption now, or even two years ago, for instant messaging 
having forward secrecy in it is just a good practice. It’s just what all the other IM 
encryption schemes are doing as well. Signal does it, WhatsApp does it”.  
In light of the recent history of secure communications and the debates within 
the developer community, we can identify an effect that can be labeled as “feedback 
loop” effect: boosted by Signal’s innovations, older protocols have been refurbished, 
and new standards are now being discussed that aim at bringing some of these 
properties to a documented and stabilized form. 
In the field of email encryption, a new specification was proposed around 2016, 
called Autocrypt, that aimed at facilitating the key management by putting public keys 
into email headers. Following the trend of bringing end-to-end encryption to the masses 
by taking the responsibility for the key management away from users, Autocrypt aims at 
rejuvenating email encryption by making PGP more accessible for non-technical 
communities. PGP has recently made a comeback in the field of instant 
communications, with the rapid growth of “chat over email”; for instance, Delta.Chat, 
that combines Signal’s with Autocrypt specifications and rPGP (a memory-saving 
optimized version of PGP).  
The OTR protocol has also been transformed and updated under the influence of 
Signal: in the OTR v3, the multi-device (desktop and mobile) problem has been fixed. 
And the newer OTR v4, according to its author Ian Goldberg, has features that address 
specifically shortcomings of Signal, such as deniability20. 
 
20 The encryption technique that allows to ‘deny’ the existence of an encrypted file or message, 
in the sense that an adversary is unable to prove that the associated data exists. 
Other standards were designed, such as the OMEMO protocol, that brings 
asynchrony into OTR and combines some of the properties of OTR and Signal protocol, 
adapted for use in federated messaging systems based on XMPP. Signal’s success has 
also brought attention of the cryptographic community to a few unsolved problems, 
such as metadata exposure, and other issues related to the centralized nature of Signal 
and other popular IM tools. This leads to a certain “revival” of federated systems, with 
projects such as Matrix and Delta.Chat (and other “chat-over-email” apps), and the rise 
of mixnets and peer-to-peer solutions such as Briar, as a way to protect users’ metadata. 
Finally, a recent effort called MLS (for Messaging Layer Security) has been 
launched to develop a standard offering message confidentiality, integrity and 
authentication, asynchronicity, forward and future secrecy and scalability. MLS aims at 
providing possibilities for federation between various encryption protocols for key 
establishment, authentication, and confidentiality services. As the draft standard 
mentions, MLS “draws on lessons learned from several message prior message-oriented 
security protocols [such as] S/MIME, OpenPGP, Off the Record and Double Ratchet21. 
Signal’s impact goes beyond “linear” leap from older to modern protocols. The 
turn to mass encryption has shaken the secure messaging community, instigated 
protocol renewals and raised new challenges, many of them still being unsolved. It has 
also inspired new approaches, such as, for instance, the new trend of “chat-over-email” 
(with Delta.Chat as one of its popular examples), that mainly criticizes Signal for using 
phone numbers as user identifiers, and suggests to turn to a more privacy-preserving 
email-based identification.  
 
 
 
21 https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/mls/about/  
Conclusions 
 
Addressing the adoption of Signal as a “quasi standard” or de facto standard, 
this article has showed that, as encryption becomes much more of a public concern than 
it was a few years ago, several end-to-end encrypted messaging developers are growing 
skeptical of traditional arenas of exchange and dialogue on potential standards, such as 
the IETF, XMPP Foundation, W3C or NIST, which they consider less effective (or 
more ‘compromised’) than a development-based approach. Does this mean that, as far 
as widespread adoption of encryption in secure messaging is concerned, we are looking 
at the “end” of the standardization era? Will governance of encrypted messaging happen 
by infrastructure and by code, by ‘something that works’? 
Indeed, the capacity of a tool to appeal to, and be mobilized by, a large pool of 
users as “something that works” seems to be a core indicator of success and adoption as 
a de facto standard. The IETF itself has recently acknowledged an “opportunistic turn” 
in encryption (IETF, 2014) that gained momentum in 2014 after the Snowden 
revelations, and consists in a progressive move of the crypto community towards 
making encryption “seamless”, with almost no efforts required from users.  
In some cases, it is strikingly interesting to observe how the actual cryptographic 
protocol and security and privacy properties lose their importance for users, compared 
to the user interface features and he reputation of the app’s creator. Thus, motivations 
for adoption of privacy-enhancing tools are also dependent on the reputation of their 
creators, as well as more traditional “governance” dynamics such as shifting 
geopolitical alliances that may affect the reach of government agencies. 
Interoperability and de facto standardization processes are one of the several 
dynamics that speak to Internet governance in a STS sense, as “mundane” and informal 
activities that come to be invested of a clear socio-political value. Other such dynamics 
are the tensions between centralization, federation and decentralization of technical 
architectures -- and of communities; concentration of leadership, and controversies 
between prominent albeit informal leaders; and last but not least, the openness of code, 
which is linked to both geographical differences and to the variety of user threat models, 
and is a concern of varying importance for different actors. 
The analysis of how interfaces and underlying protocols and architectures are 
created and ‘stabilized’ helps us to address important questions that speak to Internet 
governance. We have analyzed here how long-term changes in infrastructure via 
standardization, whether it happens through more informal means or more traditional 
avenues such as the IETF, requires inspecting the attitudes of developers towards 
adoption, their relationship to institutions, as well as their business models (or lack 
thereof). 
Further research may address, for example, how an analysis of the technical 
design choices made by developers can both provoke new questions in the 
cryptographic research community, and lead to the revisiting of previous design choices 
that the secure messaging developer community may have made that are at odds with 
user expectations. Also, we expect to address how the choice of centralization, 
decentralization, federation can be qualified as a tentative of “governance by 
infrastructure” (Musiani et al., 2016) -- an attempt to stabilize a governance model, both 
for the technology and the communities managing it, through the technology itself. 
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